Canadian network security services built by CCIEs, with segmentation, access control and firewall policy actually enforced.
One Canadian team draws the zones, writes the policy, and stops unknown devices getting anywhere useful. Network segmentation is the part most estates started and never finished.
Segmentation zones drawn from how your traffic actually moves, not from an org chart. Secure network design starts with observed flows, so the zones survive contact with real users instead of getting holes punched in them by Friday.
Rules written, tested, documented and pruned, on the platforms you already run. We find what's shadowed, unused or too broad, delete it, and record a reason against every rule that stays.
802.1X and posture checks, so an unrecognised device lands nowhere it matters. Network access control runs in monitor mode first, which tells us exactly which devices would have failed before anything is denied.
80% of enterprise servers can be reached from anywhere inside the network (Zero Networks, 2026 Lateral Movement Exposure Report). Network segmentation is the unfinished job, and it's the one that decides how far an intruder gets.
IN PRODUCTION
Most networks we inherit are one flat space with a good firewall at the edge and nothing behind it. We spend the first fortnight mapping what actually talks to what, then cut it into zones over a quarter without taking production down. The gap is never the box. It's that nobody ever finished the zones, so finance sits in the same space as the print server.
I run this practice, so this is written by the engineer who'll own your zones, not by a product page.
Almost every mid-market network we meet has a strong edge and very little behind it, and attackers have noticed. The question isn't whether you own a next generation firewall. It's how far one compromised laptop travels before anything stops it, and in most estates the honest answer is most of the way. One compromised host reaches 85% of internal systems on the first hop, and 87% of servers accept administrative connections from broad internal sources (source: Zero Networks, 2026 Lateral Movement Exposure Report, 312 environments; that vendor sells microsegmentation, so read its figures with the interest in mind). East west traffic inspection is the gap those numbers describe. East west traffic is the majority of what your network carries and almost none of it gets filtered.
We start with what talks to what, because nobody can draw zones from memory. Then we design network segmentation you can operate after we leave, which usually means fewer zones than a whiteboard produces. Risk sits in three predictable places: firewall rules nobody pruned after a migration, an any-any rule left in for a project that finished in 2023, and a management interface reachable from the staff network. Secure network design is mostly the discipline of closing those three, in that order, before anyone buys anything.
The Cyber Centre published AL26-018 on 2026-08-11, covering a high-severity flaw in Cisco Secure Firewall ASA and Threat Defense remote access VPN with exploitation confirmed in the wild, and its own advice includes minimising internet-facing management interfaces (source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, 2026). Edge kit is an entry point now, not a wall, which is the practical argument for putting policy behind it. Segmentation also shrinks PCI DSS scope, and that's the one place this work pays for itself in a number an accountant will read.
Four steps, and step 01 is measurement instead of opinion. We watch real traffic for a fortnight before drawing a single zone, because every organisation we meet is wrong about what talks to what. The application diagram is three years old, backup traffic goes somewhere nobody documented, and there's usually one device with a route into finance that nobody can explain.
Two weeks of observed traffic, east west included, turned into a list of what genuinely needs to reach what. Zones drawn from observed flows survive contact with users. Zones drawn from an org chart get holes punched in them by Friday.
Fewer, larger zones first, with the crown jewels separated properly and a written policy per boundary. We size it so your own team can run it after we leave, on the platforms you already licence.
Monitor mode before deny mode, one zone at a time, with a rollback that takes minutes rather than a weekend. Nothing goes to enforcement on a Friday afternoon.
Dead rules removed, intrusion detection and prevention placed where east west traffic actually crosses a boundary, 802.1X rolled out site by site, and a diagram that matches the running configuration.
Answers first, including which parts of this you probably don't need yet. An architect takes the call, not a salesperson.
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