Identity and access management, including the part where leavers lose access

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  • Broadcom
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  • Mondou
  • Western University
  • Votatec
  • Ren's Pets
  • City of Mississauga
The work

Identity and access management, three pillars, one operator.

Most IAM services stop at the platform. One Canadian team builds it, locks down the admin accounts, and proves access came off.

  1. Identity platform

    Directory, single sign on, MFA, and conditional access on the licences you already hold. Most Microsoft Entra ID tenants we open already carry the features nobody switched on.

  2. Privileged access

    Admin accounts vaulted, elevation granted just in time, every session recorded. That's privileged access management (PAM) rather than a stronger login, and it covers the small set of accounts that can change the environment itself.

  3. Joiners and leavers

    Provisioning, role changes, and identity governance your auditor can read. Joiner, mover, and leaver wired to the directory, so an account dies with the employment that justified it.

By industry

Does Identity and Access Management work the same way in every industry?

No. The Identity and Access Management work is the same craft in every sector, but the conditions around it are not. In financial services that means OSFI's technology and cyber risk rules; in healthcare, provincial health privacy law; and in legal, Law Society duties and solicitor-client privilege. We keep the service and change the part that bends.

  • Segregation of duties, provable per transaction.

    OSFI B-13. Technology and cyber risk across three domains: governance, technology operations and resilience, and cyber security. It binds federally regulated institutions, and only those.

    • OSFI B-10
    • OSFI E-23
    • Provincial credit union regimes
    Financial services IT
  • Who opened which chart, provable, because someone will ask.

    PHIPA. Ontario's health privacy act, with its own definition of a custodian and its own duties for the agents acting on a custodian's behalf. Your IT provider is usually an agent.

    • Provincial equivalents
    • PIPEDA
    • Breach notification
    Healthcare IT
  • Who can open which matter, provable after the fact.

    Law Society obligations. Confidentiality and competence duties reach the technology you practise with, and the vendors who touch client information. The firm is expected to have assessed the provider, which means the provider should arrive with the answers.

    • Solicitor-client privilege
    • PIPEDA breach notification
    • Quebec Law 25
    Legal IT services
  • Controlled-goods access has to be provable per person, per document.

    ITAR and the Controlled Goods Program. Registration under the Defence Production Act is mandatory before anyone examines, possesses or transfers controlled goods in Canada. Technical data counts, so a drawing sitting on a laptop is in scope.

    • CMMC
    • NIST SP 800-171
    • CPCSC
    Defence and aerospace IT
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What do you need from Identity and Access Management?

Tell us who you are and what you're working on. A senior engineer reads your message before replying, so the first answer is a real read on scope, risk and timing, within an hour, 24/7. Nothing here is a commitment, and we'll tell you plainly if we're not the right fit.

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Identity and Access Management

What happens next

  1. A senior engineer replies within an hour, 24/7, never an SDR.
  2. We book a 30-minute call to listen, sketch options, and flag risks.
  3. You get a scoped statement of work within 3 business days.

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The deep dive

Identity and access management in Canada, made real.

Most identity projects buy a platform and never finish the boring half. The boring half is the control, and this is written by the engineer who'll own your directory, not by a product page.

Why credentials still decide the incident.

Credentials are still the thing attackers use most, and the 2026 data is more interesting than the headline. Credential abuse fell to 13% as the initial way in, losing the top spot for the first time in the report's nineteen years, with software flaws taking it at 31%. Count credential abuse anywhere in the attack path, though, and it turns up in 39% of breaches, more than any other vector (source: Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report, 2026). Attackers knock less often and still walk around inside using someone's login.

Finishing the identity platform you already own.

Most Canadian organisations we meet already own a capable identity platform inside their Microsoft licensing and use perhaps a third of it. Single sign on covers the six applications somebody set up and not the twenty that came later. MFA is enabled but exempted for the executives who complained. Conditional access sits at default. An SSO implementation stalls on those decisions rather than on the tooling, and an MFA deployment that ships with an exemption list isn't finished. We build on what you hold and say plainly when a licence tier genuinely needs upgrading, which is less often than a reseller will suggest.

The failure that shows up in incidents: leavers and standing privilege.

Accounts outlive employment because offboarding runs through HR and payroll while the directory sits outside that flow entirely. Admin rights get granted for one migration and never withdrawn. We connect the joiner and leaver process to the directory, vault the privileged accounts, and grant elevation just in time so nobody holds domain admin permanently. Identity governance is what keeps that state true a year later, because a review nobody signs is a spreadsheet. PIPEDA applies here too: an account that shouldn't exist is an access-control failure you'd have to explain.

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The method

How our privileged access management and identity governance work runs.

Four steps, and step 01 is the one clients remember. Discovery on a real directory finds things nobody expects: service accounts with passwords set in 2019, shared logins for a system three teams use, accounts for contractors whose engagement ended two summers ago. We inventory identities and entitlements before recommending anything, because the shape of the problem decides whether this is a configuration job or a platform job, and those are different quotes.

Engagement phases

Phases 01 to 04

  1. Inventory identities

    Every human, service, and shared account, what it can reach, when it was last used, and whether its owner still works here.

  2. Build the platform

    Directory hygiene, single sign on across the applications that matter, MFA without the exemption list, and conditional access rules that survive contact with users.

  3. Contain privilege

    Admin accounts into a vault, elevation granted just in time and recorded, and standing domain admin reduced to nobody.

  4. Close the loop

    Joiner, mover, and leaver wired to the directory, plus access reviews that produce a signed record rather than an unread spreadsheet.

Questions

Identity and access management questions, answered straight.

Answers first, including when not to start. An architect takes the call, not a salesperson.

Usually what you hold is enough. Most Canadian mid-market organisations already have the login, second factor, and policy controls available in their existing Microsoft licensing and are using a fraction of it. A dedicated platform earns its cost when you run many non-Microsoft applications, need fine-grained entitlement reviews, or have regulator-driven separation-of-duties requirements. We'll tell you which case you're in before anyone quotes software.

Scope and blast radius. Identity and access management covers everybody: who exists, what they can reach, how they prove it's them. The privileged side covers the small number of accounts that can change the environment itself, so it needs vaulting, just-in-time elevation, and session recording rather than just a stronger login. Most organisations need the first properly before the second is worth buying, and we'll say if you're the exception.

Weeks, not months, if the directory is clean, and the directory is rarely clean. The technical work is quick. What takes time is deciding which applications matter, agreeing what happens to the people who currently hold exemptions, and testing access policy against real working patterns before it locks somebody out mid-shift. We stage it so no group loses access without warning.

Because we check, rather than trusting a ticket. A revocation that only happens in the directory leaves accounts alive in every application that holds its own local login, which on most estates is more of them than anyone expects. We map where identities are duplicated, wire what can be wired to the directory, and keep a short manual list for what can't. Then the review verifies it instead of assuming.

When your directory is unowned, because someone has to make decisions about roles and nobody can outsource that judgement. When the real driver is a single failed audit finding, which is usually cheaper to fix directly. And when a reorganisation is six weeks out, since roles you define now get redefined before the work lands. Waiting is occasionally the correct advice and we'll give it.

The tenant, the licences, and the documentation behind them. That means a written role model, the access policies and the reason each one exists, the vault plus its break-glass procedure, a joiner and leaver runbook wired to the directory, and review records somebody has signed. Admin rights stay yours, and if you take the work back in house the runbooks come with it.

Let's connect

A senior SMEnode engineer replies within an hour, 24/7.